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Putative Father's Visitation Rights
John F. Harkins*
A PROBLEM COMMONLY ENCOUNTERED in the enforcement of child sup-
port payments ordered in a proceeding in Bastardy arises when the
mother of the child, in whose custody the child remains, refuses to allow
the putative father reasonable periods of visitation. In numerous cases,
vi'sits wit .e chil- are dermed, evern -- en the putaLive father regularly
pays the weekly support and, in addition, expresses a genuine affection
and concern toward the well-being of the child. In many such instances,
the putative father refuses to make further payments, contending that if
he is obligated to support the child, he has a corresponding right of vis-
itation. In other instances, the putative father loses interest in the wel-
fare of the child and becomes remiss in his payments. In either situation,
the mother may be forced to rely on welfare assistance and the child's
support becomes the public's responsibility.
The law, of course, provides methods which are intended to compel
the putative father to support, i.e. civil contempt actions,' criminal non-
support actions,2 and wage attachments.3 Yet, as evidenced by the grow-
ing welfare expenditures, in too many instances these methods are in-
effectual. At the same time, the denial of visitation rights may eliminate
the possibility of the development of a father-child relationship and of
the affection and concern which such an attachment could provide. As-
suming that the putative father desires an association with his illegiti-
mate child which the mother refuses, what remedies does or should the
putative father have?
Historical Development
A bastard at early common and civil law was a child born out of
wedlock or under circumstances such that the mother's husband was ex-
cluded from being the father. 4 In deeming the child a bastard, the law
was attempting to discourage incestuous and illicit relationships by
branding the child with the reproach and shame that should have been
cast on those who brought him into being.5 As a bastard, the son of no
* J.D. (June, 1970), Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law;
Assistant to Director of Legal Services, Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) Ohio Juvenile
Court.
1 Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.18.
2 Ibid. § 2151.42.
3 Id. § 3115.23.
4 Briggs v. McLaughlin, 134 La. 133, 63 So. 851 (1913); McLoud v. State, 122 Ga. 393,
50 S.E. 145 (1905).
5 In Re Lunds Estate, 26 Cal. 472, 159 P. 2d 643 (1945).
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one," the son of the public,7 the custody and support of the child were
in the hands of the local parish. The bastard was a social Ishmaelite, bent
on schemes to the ruination of others, 8-so despicable that he was denied
a right to be supported by his parents, denied the right to inherit and
even denied a name, except as acquired through reputation.9
This medieval doctrine was first modified by deeming the child the
son of his mother and placing in the mother the exclusive right to cus-
tody 10 and the exclusive obligation to support the child. 1 Eventually, the
putative father was recognized to have a right to custody, subject to the
rights of the mother.1 2 Subsequently, by statute the putative father be-
came obligated to support the child.1 3
Today in nearly all jurisdictions, Bastardy statutes exist in order to
establish paternity, to compel the putative father to pay the maternity
expenses, and to compel the putative father to support the child. The
statutes, having a limited function, have failed to cover all aspects of
bastardy and in many areas one must resort to the common law for
remedies.
Recent Developments
As concerns the right of visitation, a few states have acted through
the legislature to grant 14 or to deny 5 the privilege. Others have either
remained silent on the matter or have established policy through the
judiciary.
The preponderance of case law concerned with this issue has tended
toward the recognition of visitation rights.' Courts have primarily
looked to four factors in determining these cases: acknowledgment of
paternity by the father, his support of the child, his expression of genuine
6 Adams, Nullius Filius, 6 U. Toronto L.J. 361 (1946).
7 Moore v. Baughman, 7 Ohio N.P. 149, 8 Ohio Dec. 396 (1898).
8 Schouler, Domestic Relations 704 (1905).
9 State ex rel. Griffin v. Zimmerman, 67 Ohio App. 272, 36 N.E. 2d 808 (1941).
10 Regina v. Brighton, 121 Eng. Rep. 782 (1861).
11 Criesar v. State, 97 Ohio St. 16, 119 N.E. 128 (1917); People v. Chamberlain, 121
App. Div. 385, 106 N.Y.S. 149 (1907); Commonwealth v. Callaghan, 223 Mass. 150,
111 N.E. 773 (1916).
12 Meredith v. Meredith, 272 App. Div. 79, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 462 (1947); French v. Catho-
lic Community League, 69 Ohio App. 442, 44 N.E. 2d 113 (1942); Commonwealth
ex rel. Human v. Hyman, 164 Pa. Super. 64, 63 A. 2d 447 (1949).
13 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards § 60-6 1963; Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.17.
14 Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child-His Right To Be Heard, 50 Minn. L. Rev.
1071 (1966).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat., S.H.A. Ch. 1063 § 62 (1957).
16 Mixon v. Mize, 198 So. 2d 373 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1967); Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal.
App. 2d 336, 206 P. 2d 48 (1949); Ex Parte Hendrix, 186 Okla. 712, 10 P. 2d 444 (1940),-
Cornell v. Hartley, 54 Misc. 2d 732, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 318 (1967); Baker v. Baker, 81
N.J. Eq. 135, 85 A. 816 (1913); Bagwell v. Powell, 267 Ala. 19, 99 So. 2d 195 (1957);
Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A. 2d 155 (1965).
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interest in the child, and whether his visitations would be detrimental to
the child's welfare.17 Another factor not expressly considered, but one
which was probably significant, was the type of relationship previously
existing between the putative father and the child. In situations where
the parents had cohabitated for several years and a family relationship,
though illicit, had developed, the courts granted visitation privileges to
the putative father. However, in recent Florida' and New York 9 cases,
in 1967 and 1968 respectively, the court granted visitation even though
a faly relationship hau never exisLed. And in the New York case, the
putative father had even denied paternity in a bastardy proceeding.
Of these five factors considered by the courts, the controlling prin-
ciple utilized has been the best interest of the child. The 1913 case of
Baker v. Baker2° held that both access and custody must be considered
from the viewpoint of the child's best interests. It was concluded that
the father's right to reasonable access had to be maintained unless this
visitation could be proven detrimental to the child's well-being. In re
Anonymous2' cited the development of close ties between the father and
his children as an imperative reason to permit visitation. Notably, the
court held that the welfare of the children required the father's con-
tinued relation with them. Both People ex rel Francois v. Ivanova2 2 and
Commonwealth v. Rozanski23 cited the guiding principle in determining
visitation as the best interests of the child. And in the Pennsylvania case
Judge Hoffman further remarked that "neither the fact of illegitimacy
nor the personal preferences or prejudices of the parents should control
the court's decision."
The emphasis of these findings was upon the factual situation of the
case at issue. The majority opinion in Commonwealth v. Rozanski24 in
overruling its opinion one year earlier in Golimbewski v. Stanley25 was
expressive of this:
To state as a matter of law that the visits of a putative father are
always detrimental to the illegitimate child's best interest is to exalt
rule over reality. This approach ignores the growing recognition in
our courts, and in courts throughout the nation, of the need to deter-
mine the welfare of each child in light of his own particular needs
and circumstances.
17 Mixon v. Mize, supra n. 16.
18 Ibid.
19 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 56 Misc. 2d 711, 289 N.Y.S. 2d 792 (1968).
20 81 N.J. Eq. 135, 85 A. 816 (1913).
21 12 Misc. 2d 211, 172 N.Y.S. 2d 186 (1958).
22 14 App. Div. 2d 317, 221 N.Y.S. 2d 75 (1961).
25 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A. 2d 155 (1965).
24 Ibid.
25 205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A. 2d 49 (1965).
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It should be noted that the conference of visitation rights is always sub-
ject to the court's review. The court is the directive and regulative agent
in the determination of the suitability of the putative father's visitation,
both at the time of disposition and in the subsequent situation.
The court's role in the determination of the putative father's rights
was reiterated in Commonwealth v. Rozanski.2 6 The court's opinion took
cognizance of the fact that "granting visitation privileges to the putative
father may not always serve the child's best interests." However, it
noted that visitation rights "are always a matter for the supervision of
the courts." The court stated that "should it subsequently appear that
the father's presence was detrimental to the child's welfare, the right to
visit might be withdrawn."
In Baswell v. Powell,27 acknowledgment was made of the merit of
the mother's contention that the visitation of the putative father was po-
tentially disruptive to her home. The court granted the father's request
to access but set forth specific provisions intended to prevent this situ-
ation from arising.
A consideration which advances the argument for the putative
father's visitation has been the psychological development of the child.
In People ex rel Mahoff v. Matsoui28 the court concluded that:
The father must not be excluded from a full opportunity to have
such possession of his child as will enable him to impart to it what
from the father enters into the child's character, and to indulge the
affection that a father feels and bestows, whereby the boy may grow
up in knowledge and love of him.
In Commonwealth v. Rozanski29 it was noted that:
The putative father may, in many instances, instill in the child a
sense of stability. He may develop qualities in the child which the
mother is uninterested, unwilling or incapable of developing. To the
extent that he can perform such a valuable service, his presence be-
comes exceedingly important.
The court in Baker v. Baker" saw the visitation of the putative
father conducive to the development of the affection which a child should
have for a parent interested in his well-being. Judge Howell further re-
marked that such a relationship would help enable the child to bear the
ignominy of his origin, "if he had the consciousness that he was acknowl-
edged to be on the same affectionate footing as the other (legitimate)
child, notwithstanding the disparity between their legal situations."
26 Supra n. 23.
27 Supra n. 16.
28 139 Misc. 21 (1931), 247 N.Y.S. 112.
29 Supra n. 23.
30 Supra n. 20.
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The Ohio View
If the issue of a putative father's right to visitation with his illegiti-
mate child were raised in an Ohio court, it would appear as a case of first
impression. The court would necessarily look to the Ohio Rev. Code, case
law from other jurisdictions, and judicial decisions dealing with other
issues concerning children.
The common law rule that a putative father has no right to visit his
illegitimate child has not been altered in any reported decision by an
Ohio court. As concerns custody, the putative father does have a recog-
nizable right, but one which is subject to the rights of the mother.31 In
French v. Catholic Community LeagueS2 the court stated that, if the
putative father publicly acknowledges the child as his own, has continu-
ously contributed to its support and well-being and is a proper person,
he is next in law entitled to the custody of the child, if the mother relin-
quishes or abandons control. The matter of custody is important in this
area, as the courts of Pennsylvania 33 and Illinois3 4 have considered visi-
tation to be a form of limited custody.
As elsewhere, the controlling principle in an Ohio case involving
a child is the best interest rule.3  In speaking of the court's function in
a case involving a minor, in Anonymous v. Anonymous36 the court main-
tained that: "a court's purpose is to serve the child's rights." In Kay v.
Kay3 7 in which a grandparent was asking for visitation rights, it was held
that: "the granting of visitation to others than a parent should be done
only after showing that the welfare of the child either demands it or will
not be adversely affected by it." In view of the above three Ohio cases,
if the child's best interest were explored, it appears there would be a
possibility that an Ohio court might grant a putative father the right of
visitation with his illegitimate child.
It should be noted that Ohio has both a custody statute38 and a visi-
tation statute, 9 but both deal with parental rights. However, these stat-
utes are probably not applicable to the present issue, for at common law
a putative father was not considered a parent.40 For instance, in Kay v.
31 Supra n. 12.
32 Ibid.
33 Id.
34 DePhillips v. DePhillips, 35 Ill. 2d 154, 219 N.E. 2d 465 (1966); Wallace v. Wallace,
60 Ill. App. 2d 300, 210 N.E. 2d 4 (1965).
35 In re Tilton, 161 Ohio St. 571, 120 N.E. 2d 445 (1954); Geshwiler v. Dodge, 4 Ohio
St. 615 (1855); In re Frinzl, 152 Ohio St. 164, 87 N.E. 2d 583 (1949).
36 18 Ohio Op. 2d 282, 182 N.E. 2d 205 (1962).
37 51 Ohio Op. 434, 112 N.E. 2d 562 (1953).
38 Ohio Rev. Code § 3109.03.
39 Id. § 3109.05.
40 People v. Fitzgerald, 167 App. Div. 85, 152 N.Y.S. 641 (1915); People v. Rupp,
219 Ill. App. 269 (1920); Canfield v. Porterfield, 222 Mo. App. 553, 292 S.W. 85 (1927).
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Kay4 ' the court in interpreting Ohio Rev. Code § 3109.05 stated, "the
statute does not apply to others than parents of the children involved."
If then it is the child's interests to which the court must turn its at-
tention, which interest of the child would best be served through visita-
tion with the putative father? As indicated earlier, the child's psycho-
logical well-being is a primary consideration:
It is axiomatic in child development that each child needs a close
warm relationship with an adult of each sex if he is to make an ade-
quate gender identification (i.e. male or female), if he is to get along
in a normal fashion with other people when he is an adult, if he is
to have a successful marriage and become a fit parent himself.
42
In this area does it make a difference to a child whether his father is
marital or putative? "As to the child the father is never putative." 43
In the area of support, the child's interest would also be better
served. If the putative father were permitted to visit, establish a father-
child relationship, and develop a parental concern for the child, he would
be more prone to develop a sense of responsibility toward him, and
would, therefore, be more apt to regularly support him. Not only would
the child directly benefit from the support payments, but the putative
father would probably be more inclined to provide him with his needs
and wants, over and above the court ordered payments.
Finally, in the event that the putative father would gain custody,
4
the child could make the transition more easily, if he had previously had
association with the father. In being transferred from one home to an-
other, the child would tend to adapt more readily to his new home, if he
realized that in the past the father had taken care of him and was inter-
ested in his well-being.
The argument perhaps most frequently employed against granting
the putative father visitation privileges is that the further association
(provided by the father's visitation) between the mother and father
would result in a continuation of the liaison and the birth of more bas-
tard children. However, continued sexual involvement, as well as visi-
tation, would most probably recur regardless of legislation, as long as the
parties involved consented. Secondly, if the relationship between the
mother and the putative father is deteriorated to the extent that visita-
tion cannot be privately established, it seems unlikely that court-ordered
access would lead to further sexual indulgence. The attempt to discour-
age illicit relationships by the legal prohibition of visitation would appear
at best to be ineffectual.
Other opponents of the establishment of visitation rights contend
41 Supra n. 37.
42 Barker, The Child and Divorce, 73 Case and Comment (No. 6) (1967).
43 Supra n. 23.
44 Supra n. 12.
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that continued association between the mother and putative father
diminishes the mother's opportunity and interest in marrying someone
else and consequently negates the possibility of a husband assuming the
role of father to the illegitimate child. This situation is certainly anal-
ogous to that of the divorcee. The high incidence of remarriage among
divorced women with children attests to its fallacy. In addition, the
marriage of the mother does not ensure that her husband will be willing
to supply the emotional and financial care that the putative father may
be willing to provide. Too often the husband's regard for the illegitimate
child begins where the putative father's support payments end.
Another objection is based on the argument that once the support
obligation has been legally established, the putative father can be com-
pelled to perform regardless of whether he is permitted any contact with
the child. While acknowledging that the distinction between the support
obligation and the right of visitation should be maintained, can the puta-
tive father be expected to comply with an order for support for 18 or
possibly 2145 years by force of law alone? Would not a person be more
inclined to assume his obligation if he were motivated by a genuine de-
sire to do so? And would not periodic contact between a father and his
child be more likely to provide that motivation than a law grounded on
the theory of might makes right?
Conclusion
It would seem only reasonable to assume that the putative father
should not summarily be denied the right to visit his child. Due process
requires that he be given the opportunity to state his case. In the ab-
sence of factual situations which justify denial of visitation privileges,
the best interests of the child and of society would be better served if
a putative father were given standing in order to determine a reasonable
right of visitation.
At the same time it should not be said that the putative father has
an inalienable right to visit his illegitimate offspring. Again, it is the best
interests of the child that are determinative. Even a parent does not
have an absolute right to the custody or society of his children, for the
courts have never held that the parent-child relationship could not be
terminated if the child's best interests necessitated such.4 6
In handling the question of the putative father's right to visitation,
the law must cease regarding illegitimacy in the medieval light of devils
and demons, and must consider the father-child relationship in view of
modern social knowledge. Regardless of legal status, to the child a nat-
ural putative father is as much a father as is a marital father.
45 Ohio Rev. Code § 3113.01 and § 2151.42.
46 Eastlake v. Ruggeiro, 7 Ohio App. 2d 212, 220 N.E. 2d 126 (1966).
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